The focus of this paper is unequal arrangements and special treatment for some units within Indian federalism, namely. We first explore the conceptual issues -the causes and consequences of asymmetric federalism. Next, we trace the evolution of Indian federalism and analyze the factors contributing to the asymmetric arrangements in political, administrative and fiscal relations. We bring out asymmetric arrangements arising from constitutional arrangements or conventions evolved over the years. Recent political developments and asymmetric treatment due to administrative and political exigencies are also analyzed.
Introduction
There can be a variety of motivations for various units to come together to constitute a federation. The political and economic theories of federalism attempt to understand the rationale for the "coming together" to form federations and once they are formed, analyse the conditions for "holding together". The political impulse for the smaller units to federate has to be found in issues of freedom, security, political stability and strength while keeping a separate group identity. Similarly, access to a larger common market, reaping economies of scale in the provision of nation level public goods and availability of wider choice in the bundle of services to meet diverse preferences are some of the economic reasons for the smaller units to come together to form a federation. Each federating unit will try to bargain terms advantageous to it to join the federation while the federation will try to attract entry and control exit. In this situation, symmetry in intergovernmental relationships may not be possible.
"Asymmetric federalism" is understood to mean federalism based on unequal powers and relationships in political, administrative and fiscal arrangements spheres between the units constituting a federation. Asymmetry in the arrangements in a federation can be viewed in both vertical (between Center 1 and states) and horizontal (among the states) senses. If federations are seen as 'indestructible union of indestructible states', and Center and states are seen to exist on the basis of equality; neither has the power to make inroads into the defined authority and functions of the other unilaterally. However, such 'purists' view of federalism is rarely, if at all, seen in practice. Even when the constitution guarantees near equal powers to the states, in the working on federal systems Center dominates in political, administrative as well as fiscal spheres. There is considerable volume of literature on Central domination in Indian federalism * The authors are respectively, Director, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi, 110067. India and Professor of Economics, University of California, Santa Cruz. CA 95064. U.S.A. The first author is grateful to Amaresh Bagchi and Richard Bird for extremely useful discussions and detailed comments on the earlier draft of the paper. The usual disclaimers apply. 1 The words "Centre", "Union", and "federal" are used interchangeably in this paper.
in the assignment system in the Constitution and central intrusion into the States' domains in the working of the federation. 2 Unlike the classical federations like the USA, Indian federation is not an 'indestructible union of indestructible states'. Only the Union is indestructible and the States are not. Article 3 of the Constitution vests the Parliament with powers to constitute new states by separating territories from the existing ones, alter their boundaries, and change their names. The only requirement for this is that the Bill for the purpose will have to be placed in the Parliament on the recommendation of the President and after it has been referred to the relevant State legislature for ascertaining their views (their approval is not necessary). The federation is not founded on the principle of equality between the Union and States either. The central government in India has the powers, and it actually does invade the legislative and executive domains of the states (Chanda, 1965 , Rao and Sen, 1996 , Rao and Singh, 2000 . However, the nature and basis of relationship between Center and states is not the objective of this paper.
The focus of this paper is the usually understood aspect of asymmetry in fiscal arrangements in Indian federalism, namely, unequal arrangements and special treatment for some units within a federation. Such an arrangement is quite feasible in an arrangement evolved from bargaining and accommodation. It may also be desirable to have special powers and asymmetric arrangements to accommodate diverse group interests and identity and therefore, has an important role in 'coming together' federalism as well as 'holding together' federalism. But such accommodation can only be at the margin and cannot violate the basic fabric of equality and fair treatment of jurisdictions. This would also require transparency in the arrangements.
It is important to make a distinction between unequal arrangements or asymmetries that are (i) transparent and rule based evolved to facilitate the smooth functioning of the federation and (ii) those that are opaque and discretionary caused by the balance administrative and political power and expediency. The first may be built into the constitutional arrangement itself or may be evolved through conventions for the smooth functioning of the federation. This type of asymmetry is transparent and rule based and play is important role in building the nation. In contrast, the second type of asymmetry can simply the result of administrative and political power play in a federation. In India for example, the dynamics created by the end of single party 2 For a survey of literature on centripetal bias in Indian constitution and in the functioning of Indian federalism see, rule in the center and states, emergence of coalition government at the center and regional domination of regional parties in the coalition and wielding power in the states can create asymmetries in the functioning of the federation on political considerations. This can have serious repercussions for the future of the federalism.
The paper examines the asymmetric features in Indian federalism and evaluates their contribution. Section 2 will explore the conceptual issues -the causes and consequences of asymmetric federalism. In section 3, we trace the evolution of Indian federalism and analyze the factors contributing to the asymmetric arrangements in political, administrative and fiscal relations. In section 4, we bring out asymmetric arrangements arising from constitutional arrangements or conventions evolved over the years. In this, we discuss the special arrangements in the Indian Constitution to accommodate special cases, such as Jammu and Kashmir, and the various northeastern hill states. Recent political developments and asymmetric treatment due to administrative and political exigencies are analyzed in Section 5. The main conclusions of the paper are summarized in the last section.
Asymmetric Arrangements -Some Conceptual Issues
According to Riker (1975) , federalism is an outcome of rational bargain among various constituents. The bargain may be for political or economic gains. In the political bargain, the constituents give up political autonomy for security from external threat. The economic bargain is to enable a common market and to ensure optimal provision of public services by reaping economies of scale and catering to diverse preferences. However, while striking the bargain, the constituents try to preserve their valued identity and seek special status. Motivation for special status may be purely for expanding economic opportunities and securing freedom from exploitation by larger and more powerful members of the federation. The objective may be purely political -of enhancing freedom and representation to constituents or to maximize political power and influence. It may also be cultural or religious -of preserving group Rao and Chelliah, (1997) .
identities. It may simply be a means of accommodating diverse group interests within a unified framework.
If federalism were an outcome of rational bargain among constituent units, differences in bargaining strength would be a source of asymmetry. If the issues at stake have general applicability to majority of units, then collective bargaining strength could result in greater decentralisation and all subnational units get greater autonomy. If on the contrary, the issues at stake have applicability or relevance to specific units and if they have the necessary strength to secure the special dispensation, then this could result in asymmetric arrangements in the federation. Such special arrangements may be de jure -enshrined in the constitution itself or established by tradition, or may be actually observed in practice (de facto) in the working of the federation. Such arrangements may be evolving. In many cases, special arrangements are accorded until the units are assimilated into the federation. In other cases, bargains may have to be struck by giving special status for holding the federation together. Yet other cases of asymmetry may arise purely by political alignments in a democratic polity. The way in which bargains are struck and special demands of various constituents are accommodated through asymmetric arrangements have a vital bearing on the stability of the federation.
Asymmetric arrangements need not necessarily be the outcome of constitutional arrangements. This can also result from the way in which administrative, political and fiscal systems are implemented in a federation. De facto asymmetry can also be desirable and can contribute to nation building if it is based on transparent principles. At the same time special arrangements instituted to meet short term political expediency or administrative discretion can cause secular degradation of intergovernmental institutions. Such arrangements can result in arbitrary conferring of special favors and in the long run can contribute to greater disharmony and instability in a federation.
In a centralized federation, the central government has considerable scope to discriminate among the units. The potential for discrimination will be particularly strong when the government at the center is weak and states wield significant control over the center even in a centralized federation. The issue is pertinent when we consider that regional parties in some states wield significant power over the coalition government at the center. Furthermore, there are various clauses in Article 371 which accord special powers to northeastern states. These provisions have been introduced through amendments, typically at the time of conversion of a union territory to a state, or in the case of Sikkim, after its accession to India. The safeguards provided to these states through these special provisions include respect for customary laws, religious and social practices, restrictions on the ownership and transfer of land, and restrictions on the migration non-residents to the State. State legislatures are typically given final control over changes in these provisions.
Evolution of Asymmetric Arrangements in Indian Federalism
Thus, there are various provisions in the Indian Constitution to protect group rights, and to compensate for initial inequalities in the social system. Thus the Constitution, while recognizing the idea of fundamental human rights at the individual level, does not assume an idealized initial condition of equality, either in pure economic terms or otherwise. Thus there are allowances for separate laws to govern different religious groups, and there are provisions for various kinds of "affirmative action" for extremely disadvantaged groups. The first kind of provision simply respects diversity (though this can create issues of unequal treatment across subgroups, e.g., women in two different religious groups). The second attempts to correct for specific inequities, recognizing that legislative equal treatment from very unequal initial conditions would not achieve desired equity goals. Conceptually, at this level of ethical or normative judgement, there is no difference between these provisions and the ones for the indigenous residents of northeastern states, except that the latter happen to be geographically concentrated into reasonable administrative units. If that is the case, then the relationship to federalism is not essential. The above discussion brings out that economic viability has never been a consideration in demarcating the states in India. Nor has it been a factor in reorganization of the states despite the fact that the constitution empowers the central government to reorganize them. Thus, to begin with intergovernmental relationships are placed on an uneven economic keel. Naturally, uniform assignment system in an unevenly endowed federating system results in large differences in fiscal capacities. Varying sizes of states in terms of area and population, demographic compositions, different terrain and topography cause significant variations in the unit cost of providing public services varying expenditure needs and places a heavy burden of equalization on the intergovernmental transfer system. The implications of inter-state differences in economic conditions on fiscal variables of the states are shown in Table 2 . The table brings out some important fiscal features of Indian federalism. First, variations in economic characteristics has resulted in significant differences in revenues collected in different states, partly due to differences in the capacity to raise revenues and partly due to differences in their collection efficiency. By and large, the ratio of revenues to SDP is positively related to the level of per capita. The low income states had lower revenue ratios than the middle income states, which in turn had lower ratios than the high income states.
Asymmetries in Practice in
Second, the ratio of revenues to NSDP was much lower in special category states than general category states even when the latter had comparable levels of NSDP. The singular exception to this is the case of Sikkim, which had retained the power to levy income taxes while acceding to the country. Thus, unlike in other states Sikkim has the power to levy income tax and federal income tax can not extend to Sikkim. Third, the small size of jurisdictions in these states implies that they can not reap economies of scale in providing services. Besides, hilly and inhospitable terrain in these states means that the unit cost of providing public services will be higher than in Asymmetric design of the transfer system: Thus, the different position of special category states is reflected not only in structural asymmetries and fiscal arrangements, but very importantly in the methods and patterns of Central transfers to states. In some respects, the small size of these states is an advantage in this dimension. Transfers that are high in per capita terms for these states may not place a significant cost on the rest of the nation. In fact, even the entire group of these states has a population share that is just about 5 per cent and the rest of the members of the federation may not perceive this as a significant cost. Also, this small size encourages these states to combine politically for some purposes, in councils that allow them to coordinate policies, or to collectively negotiate with the Center. This is in contrast to the insignificance of zonal councils for other states.
To understand the asymmetry, it is necessary to refer briefly to the transfer system in in aid. This is called the "gap-filling" approach. Table 4 Criteria and relative weights for tax devolution
Criterion
Weight (Per cent) It is because of this that the framers of the constitution intended the distribution of transfers should be mainly undertaken through the Finance Commission and Commission is supposed to be a statutory semi-judicial authority. However, the constitution of the commission, approach and methodology adopted by them and their recommendations have been a subject of controversy in recent times. Notable among the criticisms is the use of poverty ratio as a criterion for distributing the tax shares of the states by the ninth Finance Commission. It was argued that poverty alleviation is not an objective of general purpose transfers, and this should be taken care of by the direct anti poverty interventions initiated by rural development and urban development ministries. It is also argued that the transfer system should not be used to reward a state not making enough effort to alleviate poverty. More important criticism was the discretionary transfer made by the Ninth Finance Commission for the slum clearance in Bombay (Mumbai) and Calcutta (Kolkata) (Bagchi, 1988 , Guhan, 1989 . The Tenth Finance Commission was similarly criticized for making transfers for one state (Andhra Pradesh) as a compensation for the loss of revenue by following the prohibition policy 10 .
More serious criticism of the Finance Commissions is on the 'gap-filling' methodology.
It is alleged that 'fiscal dentistry' practised by the commissions have led to enlargement of 'budgetary cavities'. The states can gain more by lowering their tax effort and indulging in profligate spending. In fact, serious deterioration in states' finances seen in recent years is in part attributed to the transfer system (Rao, 2002 In spite of the MOUs, the fiscal position has shown a steady deterioration. Therefore, 10 Prohibition policy is the policy of prohibiting the consumption of sale of alcoholic products within the state. One state, Gujarat has consistently followed this policy right from independence and some states like Tamil Nadu and Aandhra Pradesh have followed this policy from time to time for electoral reasons. 11 One of the members of the Commission, however, wrote a note of dissent stating that the recommended design is inappropriate. The asymmetry in the plan assistance is seen mainly between the special category states and non-special category states. The formula that is applied at present is summarized in table 4.
First, 30 per cent of the central assistance for state plans is earmarked to the special category states even though their population share is only 5.4 per cent. Second, 90 per cent of plan assistance to special category states is given as grant and the remaining as loan whereas the proportion of grants in the plan assistance to other states is just 30 per cent (Table 4) .
This arrangement cannot be entirely justified on equity grounds. Surely, equity provides some justification for this. They may reflect higher costs of providing the goods and services in remote mountainous areas, due to diseconomies of scale and scope arising from small sizes of these states, and their internal diversity. Thus, higher per capita spending than even high income states in these states seen in table 1 may partly reflect higher costs of provision. Higher transfers may also be needed to meet the special expenditure requirements, such as higher levels of security, that are not required in other states. Thus, these states may to some extent be acting as agents of the Center in the provision of the national public good of strategic stability and defense. A part of the reason for higher transfers to these states may be because, as they are located in international borders, the center has not allowed foreign investments to flow into these regions and therefore has the responsibility of strengthening the regions to have domestic investments. Fiscal management is assessed as the difference between States' own total plan resources estimated at the time of finalising annual plan and their actual performance, considering latest five years.
3.
Under the criterion of the performance in respect of certain programs of national priorities the approved formula covers four objectives, viz. (i) population control, (ii) elimination of illiteracy, (iii) on-time completion of externally aided projects, and (iv) success in land reforms.
The more important reason for large transfers in these states has to be found in the political bargain that brought these areas firmly into the Indian Union, and keeps them there.
This kind of reasoning is particularly clear for such formal, separate induction into the Union as Sikkim, and for the case of Kashmir, but it also applies to cases such as Nagaland, where a long insurgency after Indian independence was finally brought under some control through the granting of statehood with special provisions, and where an implicit political bargain may require continuing transfers beyond the average 12 .
A notable feature of the state plan assistance is the steady increase in its discretionary component. Although the transfers are supposed to be given according to the NDC formula, over the years, increasing proportion of the assistance has been earmarked for specific schemes and kept outside the formula based assistance. In 2002-03 for example, the normal plan assistance for state plan schemes disbursed on the basis of the NDC formula constituted only about 46 per cent of the total state plan assistance. The remaining portion included earmarked assistance such as schemes for hill, border and desert are4as, assistance to North-east and Sikkim, slum development, Accelerated Power Development, accelerated irrigation benefit program, Prime Minister's Gramodaya Yojana (village development plan) and Prime Minister's rural roads program.
An important component non-formula based assistance under state plan schemes is the pass through assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors to the state governments. In recent years, there has been a significant increase lending by multilateral and bilateral donors to the subnational governments and some discussion of this is in order. These loans are a part of state plan assistance and therefore, discussion on this is important. According to the seventh schedule to the constitution all matters pertaining to international affairs (10), having foreign jurisdiction (16), United Nations Organization (12) and foreign loans (37) fall within the jurisdiction of central government and states are not allowed to borrow or take aid directly from bilateral or multilateral donors. However, in recent years, the states have been allowed to negotiate directly with multilateral and bilateral donors though the loans are eventually routed through the Central government. This has enabled some states to seek substantial loans from multilateral donors whereas others have not been able to access the assistance. Naturally, the questions of propriety and partisanship in the selection of states have come up. The states ruled by regional parties with pivotal support to coalition government at the center may find it easier to access the facility 12 One other possible reason also involves strategic motives. For strategic reasons, the central government may wish to restrict private investment, particularly, but not restricted to, foreign investment into these regions. Thus public spending may be a compensation for this restriction. To some extent, this is also a consequence of features of the political bargain that restrict non-residents of the state from certain kinds of ownership of property in the state, thus acting as a restriction on investment. Generally, after meeting the repayment liabilities, some additional resources are mobilized thorough these instruments for spending on plan schemes. Asymmetry can result from the volume of loans allocated to each state and the extent of interest rate repression. Until the early 1990s, the rates of interest charged on market States' loans were substantially below the market rates of interest, but thereafter, interest rates have been better aligned to market rates. The whole process is not rule based and is opaque; there is significant scope for favouring some states over others in the allocation of market borrowing. This is particularly true in a government ruled by a coalition of parties and with some members of coalition wielding power in the states.
There can be tremendous scope for discrimination among the states arising from the practice of rescheduling and writing off of the loans on special considerations. In the past, a number of Finance Commissions were asked go into States' indebtedness and recommend rescheduling and writing off, and based on the recommendations, rescheduling was done.
Referring the issue of states' indebtedness was only a convention that was established and not a constitutional necessity. In recent years, however, the central government has written off of
States' loans in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and more recently proposes to write off loans of Nagaland without referring the issue to any body on a discretionary basis. The reasons advanced for the relief was that these states fought the nations battle on terrorism/insurgency and therefore have had to suffer loss of economic activity and revenues and therefore need to be compensated.
They also had to create additional infrastructure to fight terrorism and a part of the loan spent on this should be written off. Whatever be the merits of these arguments, such practices have serious moral hazard problems and the arbitrary manner in which the central government decides to write off the loans of the states creates asymmetry and scope for discrimination, which may not be in the long-term interest of Indian federation.
Central Sector and Centrally Sponsored Schemes:
The most important scheme of differential treatment however is possible in the assistance In economies subject to centralized planning and particularly in those that had to traverse through acute scarcities, price and quantity controls on both inputs and outputs are common.
Once introduced, these controls continue even when they have outlived their utilities, either because no one bothers to reassess them or they create strong vested interest for their continuance. In addition, there can be support prices on various commodities introduced and these tend to be much higher than border prices, introducing an element of implicit subsidy. All these price and quantity controls are sources of invisible transfers and can impact differently on different states. It is impossible to go into the plethora of such controls and invisible transfers in Indian federalism, but some important and obvious sources of inter-state discrimination may be pointed out.
Determination of procurement prices of foodgrains is an important source of invisible transfer. In an economy with high tariffs, when the support prices declared by the government are significantly higher than the prices that would have ruled in the market, and when the government owned Food Corporation of India guarantees to purchase the commodities at the declared price, the market prices will be necessarily higher than it would be otherwise. As the support prices are fixed mostly for agricultural commodities that are relatively price inelastic, this tends to have significant regional redistribution. This policy has a discriminatory impact on different states depending on the product (crop) chosen for fixing support prices and the extent to which support prices vary from the border prices (international price + transportation cost). Not surprisingly, determination of support prices on wheat, rice and other products is a matter of controversy in Indian federation. It is not uncommon to see some of the regional parties holding power in the states who are partners in the coalition government at the center influencing the determination of procurement prices.
14 Independence day speech is one such occasion to make announcement on new schemes.
Another recent example of price -quantity control system impacting on the resource distribution in asymmetric manner is the allocation of subsidized foodgrains to different states.
The central government has the discretion to allocate foodgrains to states for distribution in fair price shops according to a formula determined by it, but it can exercise considerable discretion in distributing foodgrains for regions affected by draught and flood. It can send substantial relief to states ruled by the "friendly" parties and make token releases to those ruled by "unfriendly"
ones. These examples can be multiplied.
Another important policy instrument that can discriminate between the states is through regional policies, particularly the policy regarding the location of central public sector enterprises and their head office and regional/zonal offices. In a planned economy, location decisions are not taken necessarily on the basis of economic considerations. In Indian case, during the first few plans, major investments in steel and Coal industries were made on the basis of backward and forward linkage considerations. However, in more recent years, the issue of locating central industrial units has been a subject of controversy. Similarly, the location of regional offices of railways has also been a subject of much discussion. Surely, this can be an important source of discrimination between the states.
Political Elements in Asymmetric Practices
A major source of asymmetric treatment of different states has to be found in the nature of Indian polity and the way in which political institutions have functioned over years. In the initial years of independence the issue did not come to the fore because, the Indian National Congress, which was in the forefront of independence movement had little opposition and had a virtual monopoly in forming the government at the center as well as states. Since at both central and state levels a single party ruled, and as the party itself was centralized, there was little scope for disharmony between the center and individual states and for discrimination between the states. However, four important developments in Indian federalism have impacted to create asymmetric treatment of States in Indian federation. These are discussed in the following.
The first important development is the increasing economic centralization of Indian Fourth, is the formation of coalition governments at the Center. As none of the national parties emerging victorious during the last two general elections, they had to forge alliances with other parties including regional parties to form governments. The regional parties could force their agenda and try to extract the maximum for the arrangements. This is particularly true when the parties had a pivotal standing in the coalition.
Finally, in general, the time horizon of the politicians and parties has become more myopic in recent years. As electorate have become more cynical and their trust and faith in the politicians have shown a nosedive the probability of representatives getting reelected has declined sharply. In the last general election, only 38 per cent of the Members of Parliament got reelected whereas in the previous general election. Given that the probability of getting reelected is low, the elected representatives find it more worthwhile maximizing their personal gains when in office rather than working for the welfare of their electorate.
Thus, on the one hand, the central government continues to have enormous financial strength to dispense favors to state governments and on the other, has lost enormous power to prevent the strong states from bargaining and securing the allocation of resources in their favor.
The states ruled by regional parties with significant strength in the Parliament have become pivotal and have been able to secure substantially higher resources relative to other states. This has been achieved by the fact that significant proportion of explicit and implicit transfers in Indian federation is discretionary. This dynamics of Indian federalism summarizes the recent developments in fiscal asymmetry in Indian federalism 16 . 15 For the analysis of regional parties in India's federal system, see Manor (1995) . And Rao and Singh (2001). 16 The above development has been a subject of consternation and concern. Referring to the tactics adopted by the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, an editorial in a leading daily stated, " ….Armed with several spiral folders listing myriad demands Mr. Naidu will characteristically show the folders around, and in all likelihood, have his way too. Like he easily managed to get 10 lakh tons of rice from the food for work program, a new international airport, a drought relief assistance and Rs. 1300.17 crores for countering extremism. …. Already, there are charges that a "weak" Center is being routinely "blackmailed" by Mr. Naidu. He has very cleverly used his political leverage to the maximum, and much to the discomfiture of his detractors, he has also got key Andhra politicians and bureaucrats into decision-making positions in Delhi" (Editorial in Asian Age, June 11, 2003)
Concluding Remarks
This paper has attempted to bring out asymmetric arrangements in Indian federalism.
Asymmetry in administrative, political and economic spheres in federal systems is unavoidable and in fact, may be necessary not only to 'come together' but also to 'hold together'. However, while transparent asymmetric arrangements that can be justified on grounds of overall gains to the federation contribute to the nation building, the discriminatory policies followed purely on short term political gains can be inimical to the long term interests and stability of federalism.
The rationale for asymmetry arises from the premise that inter alia, federalism is a rational bargain of various units. Thus, the terms of joining the federation depend on the bargaining strength. Further, even in a federation with no provision for exit, political alignments determine the bargaining strength of governments at different units in their interaction with center and this may result in discriminatory treatment of various units. The potential for discrimination is higher in more centralized federations and is inversely related to the political strength of the central governrnent vis-à-vis the various regional governments.
It is important to make a clear distinction between asymmetric arrangements which are rule based and transparent and those caused by political and administrative expediency. The asymmetric arrangements built in the constitutional framework itself and those that have been evolved to ensure smooth functioning of the federation belong to the first category. These are rule based and transparent and contribute to nation building. Over time, with changing situation, there may be changes in the arrangement depending on factors such as the extent to which various units assimilate themselves in the federation and their relative bargaining strength. In contrast, the asymmetric arrangements arising from political and administrative expediency are opaque and discretionary. They can lead to degradation of intergovernmental institutions and can be inimical to the stability of the federation in the long term.
The paper has analyzed both types of asymmetries in Indian federalism in respect of administrative, political and fiscal spheres, with greater emphasis on the last. It chronicles the growth of asymmetries over the years. It argues that the rule based and transparent asymmetrythe special treatment to certain states accorded in the constitution and special treatment accorded to some of the states in evolving intergovernmental transfer system, have contributed to the health of the federation. In contrast, the discretionary treatment of states arising from changing configuration of political power structure, vagaries of coalition and regional party politics, weaken the institutions of intergovernmental finance and can be harmful to the stability of Indian federation in the long term.
